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We study intertemporal price discrimination when consumers can store for future consumption needs.
To make the problem tractable we offer a simple model of demand dynamics, which we estimate using
market level data. Optimal pricing involves temporary price reductions that enable sellers to discriminate
between price sensitive consumers, who anticipate future needs, and less price-sensitive consumers.
We empirically quantify the impact of intertemporal price discrimination on profits and welfare. We
find that sales: (1) capture 25-30% of the profit gap between non-discriminatory and third degree price














Consumers are heterogenous in many ways including preferences, income, transportation cost
and storage costs. Consumer heterogeneity generates incentives for ﬁrms to price discrim-
inate. When consumer types are unobservable ﬁrms rely on various screening mechanisms
to achieve separation. Empirically, we know little about the potential beneﬁts from price
discrimination in actual settings, or how well various screening mechanisms work. Further-
more, the impact of price discrimination on welfare, especially in an oligopoly setting, is
theoretically unclear.
The goal of this paper is to empirically study the role of intertemporal price discrimina-
tion in storable goods markets. In these markets, temporary price reductions (sales) can be a
way to separate between consumers based on their ability to store. We estimate preferences,
and use the estimates to test whether sales can be driven by price discrimination. Next, we
evaluate the eﬀectiveness of sales as a price discriminating tool relative to third-degree dis-
crimination, where the seller can identify the diﬀerent consumer types and prevent arbitrage.
Finally, we assess the consequences of discrimination on consumer and total welfare.
In order to address these issues we need a model of pricing that is workable and consistent
with demand dynamics. A key computational and conceptual challenge in modelling the
sellers’ problem is the size of the state space. It is not clear how to reasonably model
the complex problem sellers face. Sellers’ proﬁt s ,i np r i n c i p l e ,d e p e n do nt h ei n v e n t o r y
of each potential buyer. In which case, not only modeling the seller problem becomes very
complex, but also it is unreasonable to assume the seller can access and process such detailed
information. One could imagine solving the seller’s problem by assuming some sort of rule
of thumb or approximation to the optimal behavior. We explore an alternative which relies
on a simple dynamic demand model. The simplicity of the model helps in two ways. First,
demand is easy to estimate using market level data and computationally no more costly
than static demand estimation. Second, the proposed demand framework leads to a simple
solution to the sellers’ pricing problem. The model provides a clear delineation of what
sellers must observe to solve their problem, and makes the problem tractable.
The simplicity of the demand model is due to the storage technology: consumers store for
a pre-speciﬁed maximium number of periods. Characterizing consumer behavior does not
require solving the value function. The problem remains dynamic, but easy to solve. The
model is ﬂexible enough to accommodate product diﬀerentiation, consumer heterogeneity
and endogenous consumption, while allowing for storability.
We estimate the demand model using store level scanner data for soft drinks and ﬁnd
that consumers who store are more price sensitive than consumers who do not. This sug-
gests that ﬁrms would beneﬁt from separating these groups, targeting storers with lower
2prices. To evaluate proﬁts and consumer surplus under diﬀerent pricing regimes we use the
estimated demand, and respective ﬁrst order conditions. Two benchmarks are considered.
One benchmark is non-discriminatory pricing. The other benchmark is third degree price
discrimination under the assumption of no arbitrage, namely, assuming sellers can target
diﬀerent populations. Proﬁts under third degree discrimination are a non-feasible upper
bound on gains from price discrimination. The target is not feasible because in practice
sellers cannot perfectly separate the diﬀerent buyer types. We ﬁnd that third degree price
discrimination would increase proﬁts by 9-14% relative to non-discriminatory prices. Sales,
as a form of partial discrimination, enable sellers to capture around 24-30% of the potential
additional proﬁts generated from discrimination.
The welfare implications of third degree price discrimination by a monopolist were studied
by Robinson (1933), and later formalized by Schmalensee (1981), Varian (1984) and Aguirre
et al. (2010) among others. The impact of discrimination on welfare is ambiguous. In
oligopoly situations there are virtually no (theoretical) welfare results. Therefore examining
the issues empirically is of particular interest. We ﬁnd that total welfare increases. Sellers
are better oﬀ as are consumers who store. Consumers who do not store are worse oﬀ, but in
most cases their loss in more than oﬀset by storers’ welfare gains.
Besides quantifying the impact of price discrimination there are other reasons to be
interested in our supply side analysis. There is a long tradition in Industrial Organization
of using demand estimates in conjunction with static ﬁrst order conditions to infer market
power. Demand dynamics render static ﬁrst order conditions irrelevant. A supply framework
consistent with demand dynamics is needed to infer market power. In addition, Macro and
Trade economists are interested in studying the pass through of exchange rates and monetary
shocks to consumer prices. To fully understand disaggregate micro level patterns one needs
a supply model that can be used to simulate the pass through.
Our paper is related to several strands in the literature. Numerous papers in Economics
and Marketing document demand dynamics, speciﬁcally, demand accumulation (see Blat-
tberg and Neslin (1990) for a survey of the Marketing literature). Boizot et al. (2001) and
Pesendorfer (2002) show that demand increases in the duration from previous sales. Hendel
and Nevo (2006a) document demand accumulation and demand anticipation eﬀects, namely,
duration from previous purchase is shorter during sales, while duration to following purchase
is longer for sale periods. Erdem, Imai and Keane (2003), and Hendel and Nevo (2006b) esti-
mate structural models of consumer inventory behavior. Our demand model is motivated by
this literature but oﬀers substantial computational savings and a tractable supply analysis.
Several explanations have been proposed in the literature to why sellers oﬀer temporary
discounts. Varian (1980) and Salop and Stiglitz (1982) propose search based explanations
which deliver mixed strategy equilibria, interpreted as sales. Sobel (1984), Conlisk Gerstner
3and Sobel (1984), and Pesendorfer (2002) present models of intertemporal price discrim-
ination in the context of a durable good (more recently used by Chevalier and Kashyap
(2011)), while Narasimhan and Jeuland (1985) and Hong, McAfee and Nayyar (2002) do so
for storable goods.
Our estimates show that sellers have an incentive to intertemporally price discriminate,
suggesting that sales are probably driven by discrimination motives. Incentives for sales are
similar to Narasimhan and Jeuland (1985) and Hong, McAfee and Nayyar (2002) but in a
somewhat diﬀerent context. Hong et al. model an homogenous good sold in diﬀerent stores,
under unit demand, and single unit storage. Since the interest in this paper is empirical we
need a framework amenable for demand estimation, that allows for product diﬀerentiation
and endogenous consumption and storage levels, depending on prices.
The abovementioned third-degree discrimination theoretical results (e.g., Robinson (1933),
Schmalensee (1981), and Aguirre et al. (2010)) apply to the intertemporal discrimina-
tion in our model, once we reinterpret demand during sale periods —following Robinson’s
terminology— as the weak demand, and demand during non-sale periods as the strong de-
mand.
Finally, our results relate to several papers in the empirical price discrimination litera-
ture. Shepard (1991) ﬁnds that, consistent with price discrimination motives, the price gap
between full and self service is higher at gas stations oﬀering both levels of service relative to
the average diﬀerence between prices at stations oﬀering only one type of service. Verboven
(1996) considers whether discrimination can explain diﬀerences in automobile prices across
European countries. Villas-Boas (2009) uses demand estimates and pricing (in the vertical
chain) to predict that banning wholesale price discrimination in the German coﬀee market
would increase welfare.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next subsection we presents some motivating facts.
Section 2 presents a general, but non practical, model of demand and supply followed by our
simple model. Section 3 presents the estimation. Section 4 presents the application to soft
drinks.
1.1 Motivating Facts
F i g u r e1s h o w st h ep r i c eo fa2 - l i t e rb o t t l eo fC o k ei nas t o r eo v e ray e a r . T h ep a t t e r ni s
typical of pricing observed in scanner data: regular prices and occasional sales, with return
to the regular price. With the exceptions of a short transition period, in any given 2-3 week
window there are two relevant prices: a sale price and a non-sale price. We note that while
sales are not perfectly predictable they are quite regular and frequent. Both these facts will
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Figure 1: A typical pricing pattern
Note: The ﬁgure presents the price of a 2-litter bottle of Coke over 52 weeks in one store.
The pattern in Figure 1 raises two immediate questions: how do consumers faced with
this price process behave? And what is the supply model that generates this pattern?
Since soft-drinks are storable, pricing like this creates incentives to anticipate future
needs: buy during a sale for future consumption. Indeed, quantity purchased shows evidence
of demand anticipation. Table 1 displays the quantity of 2-liter bottles of Coke sold during
sale and non-sale periods (we present the data in more detail later). During sales the quantity
sold is signiﬁcantly higher (623 versus 227, or 2.75 times more). More importantly, the
quantity sold is lower if a sale was held in the previous week (399 versus 465, or 15 percent
lower). The impact of previous sales is even larger if we condition on whether or not there
is a sale in the current period (532 versus 763, or 30 percent lower, if there is a sale and 199
versus 248, or 20 percent lower in non sale periods).
We interpret the simple patterns present in Table 1 as evidence of demand dynamics and
that consumers’ ability to store detaches consumption from purchases. Table 1 shows that
purchases are linked to previous purchases, or at least, to previous prices. Moreover, Table
1 hints that storing behavior might be heterogeneous. If every consumer stored during sales
we would expect quantity sold at non-sale price that follows a sale to be quite small. The
ﬁr s tr o ws h o w st h a ti sn o tt h ec a s e .
5Table 1: Quantity of 2-Liter Bottles of Coke Sold
−1 =0 −1 =1
 =0 247.8 199.4 227.0
 =1 763.4 531.9 622.6
465.0 398.9
Note: The table presents the average across 52 weeks and 729 stores of the number of 2-litter
bottles of Coke sold during each week. As motivated in the text, a sale is deﬁned as any price
below 1 dollar.
We now turn to the second question: what supply model generates such a pricing pattern?
The literature has oﬀered several explanations. First, in principle the sales pattern could
be driven by changes in costs or demand. In practice, its hard to imagine changes in static
conditions that would generate this pricing pattern.
An alternative explanation focuses on consumer search behavior. Varian (1980) and Salop
and Stiglitz (1982) oﬀer a model where in equilibrium ﬁrms pricing involves mixed strategies
and price reductions. While these models have some attractive features, like their ability
to generate random sales, they also yield some predictions that are hard to match with the
data (like a continuous price support).
A third theory explains sales as part of retailer behavior and multi-category pricing (Lal
and Matutes, 1994). In these models price reductions are seen as loss leaders and meant to
draw consumers in to the store.
A ﬁnal set of theories focus on sales as intertemporal price discrimination (Sobel, 1984;
Conlisk, Gerstner and Sobel, 1984; Pesendorfer, 2002; Narasimhan and Jeuland, 1985; Hong,
McAfee and Nayyar, 2002). We focus on this class of models and test whether consumer
preferences and storing ability can explain sales in this market. Finding that it can, we
quantify the impact of sales.
2 The Model
In order to evaluate the impact of intertemporal price discrimination we need to compute
equilibrium prices. We start by presenting a general model of demand and supply for storable
goods and discuss the diﬃculties in solving the model. In setting up the general model, the
goal is to highlight not only the computational savings of the simple model we propose, but
also the conceptual problems that arise in the general set up that need to be resolved. We
then propose a simple demand model, derive its predictions and its implications for seller
behavior.
62.1 Demand and Supply with Storable Products
Assume consumer  has preferences at time  given by a utility function (q;) where
q =[ 1 2]0 is the vector of quantities consumed of the  varieties of the product, ,
is the quantity consumed of a nummeraire, and  is a vector of consumer speciﬁct i m e
varying parameters. We denote (q) ≡ (q;) Consumers can store for future
consumption at costs (i),w h e r ei is a vector of dimension  of the inventory of all brands.
Consumers know current prices and the distribution of prices at period +1(p|) where
p is a vector of dimension  of prices and  is the history up to 
The consumer’s problem in each period  is to choose purchases, x and consumption,






E[+(q+ +) − (i+)|] (1)
s.t. p
0
+x+ + + ≤ + and i+ = i+−1 + x+ − q+
where  i st h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o r ,a n d i st h ec o n s u m e r ’ si n c o m ea tp e r i o d. The expectation
is taken with respect to future prices as well as uncertain future needs. Consumers trade oﬀ
purchasing today, if prices are low, and paying a storage cost. Market demand, X(p)
is given by aggregation across consumers who solve the problem in equation (1).
The seller’s problem is to choose a series of prices to maximize the discounted ﬂow of
expected proﬁts, () For simplicity, we assume the seller is a monopolist who can commit
to future prices, and produces all varieties at a constant marginal cost, . Then the seller’s










T h ee x p e c t a t i o ni st a k e nw i t hr e s p e c tt of u t u r ed e m a n ds h o c k st h a ti m p a c tb o t ht h e
functional form of X+ and the history in future periods, + Note, that if demand is
static, X(p)=X(p), then the pricing problem is static.
2.1.1 Equilibrium and the Information Structure
The equilibrium prices are determined by the interaction between the problems outlined in
equations (1) and (2). Regardless of what is computationally feasible we would like to discuss
what information can be reasonably assumed to be available and likely to be used. What do
players’ strategies depend on in these markets?
7P r i c i n g ,i np r i n c i p l e ,m a yd e p e n do nt h ei n v e n t o r yh e l db ye a c ho ft h eb u y e r si nt h e
population as well as their preference shocks. Given pricing, consumers purchasing decisions
would depend on such information as well, should it be available to them. Howvere, in-
ventories, which depend on previous consumption, are private information. Past purchases
could be used to infer individual preference, and perhaps to estimate the current inventory
holdings of each buyer. While some individual information might be available for customers
that use loyalty cards, the informational and computational burden of processing such in-
formation seems enormous. Therefore, its umreasonable to assume that frims condition on
this information. Unable to track individual purchases over time, sellers might still ﬁnd it
useful to condition pricing on the distribution of past quantities sold or, as a proxy, on total
quantity sold. However, it raises the issue of whether buyers and competitors have access to
such information.
A more realistic assumption is that strategies depend on public information, namely,
prices. Hong, McAfee and Nayyar (2002) provide a model in which (observable) past prices
suﬃce to infer past purchases. In their model preferences are deterministic and identical, the
distribution of holdings can be inferred from purchases. Thus, the starting inventory and
the identity of those holding inventory is known at any point in time. With the empirical
goal in mind of estimating preferences, we would like a more general model, than Hong et
al., that allows for: 1) diﬀerentiated products, 2) consumption and the quantity stored to
depend on price and 3) non-deterministic demand.
2.2 A Simple Demand Model
In this section we propose a model that accommodates the empirical requirements, yet prices
are a suﬃcient statistic for the state. Although simple, it delivers an empirical framework for
estimation. We ﬁrst present the main assumptions, and then discuss the implied purchasing
patterns.
2.2.1 The Setup
First, we assume that there is heterogeneity in the willingness or ability to store.
Assumption A1: a proportion of consumers do not store.
In the setup of Section 2.1 this would arise endogenously if a fraction of the consumers
have storage costs that make it unproﬁtable to store. Therefore, one can view A1 as an
assumption on the distribution of storage costs.
We allow storers and non-storers to have diﬀerent preferences. Let 
 (q) and 
 (q)
be the preferences of the representative storing and non-storing consumer, respectively. For










We index preferences by  to allow for changing demand; we assume that consumers know
needs at least  periods in advance. Preferences could reﬂect an aggregate consumer, assum-
ing the household level preferences are of Gorman form and yield an aggregate consumer.
Alternatively, preferences could represent explicit aggregation over individual households (for
example, as in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995).
Preference heterogeneity will be an important determinant of seller behavior. It is an
empirical matter if, and how, preferences of the types diﬀer. We can, in principle, ﬁnd that
the proportion of either type is zero or that preferences are identical.











where (·) is the demand function implied by maximizing the utility in (3).
With storage, purchases and consumption need not coincide. In order to predict storers’
purchases we make the following assumptions:
A2 (storage technology): storage is free, but inventory lasts for only  periods (fully
depreciates afterwards).
Taken literally the assumption implies perishability. For example,  =1ﬁts products
that would not last more than two weeks (the period of purchase and the following). For
products with longer life a higher  would ﬁt. An alternative interpretation of the assumption
is contemplation; while the product may last longer, at the store the buyers only considers
purchasing for  periods ahead. The assumption implies simple dynamics. In the inventory
problem deﬁned in Section 2.1, the consumer and the researcher need to keep track of how
much is left in storage in diﬀerent states. As shown in the next section this is not the case
here. In addition, the assumption detaches the storage decision of diﬀerent products. In
the problem in Section 2.1 the storage cost is a function of the inventory of all varieties.
Under A2 eﬀective prices, of the other products, are a suﬃcient statistic for quantity in
storage. Eﬀective prices, deﬁned later, are the opportunity cost of period  consumption.
Moreover, eﬀective prices are public information. Thus, the assumption not only eases
demand estimation but also helps formulate the sellers’ problem.
Finally, we assume the following about prices expectations.
A3 (perfect foresight): consumers have perfect foresight regarding prices  periods
ahead.
9As we will see below with perfect foresight the consumer problem becomes particularly
simple. One may worry that perfect foresight is restrictive, thus, invalidating demand es-
timates and perhaps an inadequate assumption to study sellers behavior. It turns out the
perfect foresight assumption ﬁts the supply model under seller commitment. However, we
will also consider an alternative assumption:
A3’ (rational expectations): consumers hold rational expectations about future prices
We can solve the model under either perfect foresight (A3) or rational expectations (A3’)
for low . We present estimates under both assumptions. For low the results are similar.1
It is much easier to allow for 1 under A3.
2.2.2 Purchasing Patterns
We now derive the purchasing patterns implied by A1-A3. For ease of exposition we ignore
discounting. The application involves weekly data, and therefore discounting does not play
a big role. In order to insure a solution to the dynamic problem we focus on a ﬁnite horizon,
up to period .







(p) are purchases by storers. Non-storers behave according to (4).
Storers’ purchasing patterns are determined as follows. Their objective function is to
maximize the sum of utility in the  periods subject to a budget constraint and the storing











x + ) ≤
 X
=0
 and q ≤ x −
−1 X
=0
(x − q − e)
where x is the vector of purchases, and e is the vector of unused units that expire in period
.W eh a v ei nm i n di t e m so nw h i c he x p e n s e sa r es m a l lr e l a t i v et ow e a l t h so that   0
1We believe the reason estimates are similar is that there are well deﬁned sales and non-sale prices. If
consumers do not know future prices, but there are two clear price ranges then they purchase for storage on
sale, and never store at non-sale prices. In other words, under the two price range assumption knowledge
of future prices is not needed to generate the same storing behavior that arises under perfect foresight.
Although in the application there are more than two prices, in Figure 1 one can see a clear distinction
between sale and non-sale prices.
10for all ,t h e r e f o r ei n c o m ee ﬀects or liquidity constraints in any particular period do not play
ar o l e .
Assumptions A2 and A3 imply that storers’ solve for consumption  periods in advance.
Storage allows them to buy each product consumed at  a tt h el o w e s to ft h ep r e c e d i n g
prices. To write down the problem, we deﬁne the eﬀective price of product  in period  as


 =m i n {−} (6)
where  =m i n {} is the number of periods back in which period  consumption could
have been purchased. The constraint  ≤  (in the deﬁnition of ) takes care of the initial
periods, namely, purchases before period 0 are not feasible.
Using p








 (q)+) subject to (p
ef
t
0q + ) ≤ 
The optimization of the storer is a sequence of static optimization problems solved  periods




t ). The dynamics are taken care simply by replacing prices by eﬀective prices.
The storage of a product aﬀects the purchases and consumption of all other products
exclusively through its eﬀe c t i v ep r i c e .T os e et h a ts u p p o s ep r o d u c t was purchased during
a sale for consumption in subsequent periods. Demand for all other products is naturally
aﬀected by the fact that product  is in the pantry waiting to be consumed. How do
inventoried units of  aﬀect demand for −?S i n c e

 w a sk n o w na tt h et i m eo fp u r c h a s i n g
all varieties to be consumed at period  the impact is fully captured by plugging the eﬀective
price of consuming  in those later periods.
Having solved the optimal consumption path we need to predict purchases. In period 
the consumer might purchase for  as well as for some or all of the following  periods. For
 =0  purchases at time  for consumption at time  +  equal either 0, if  

+,
or (absent ties in eﬀective prices) 
+(pef
t+r),i f = 

+
However, since prices may repeat themselves between periods − and  consumers are
indiﬀerent when to purchase. We break the tie by assuming that buyers purchase immedi-
ately when the price is below a threshold, 




consumers buy right away, while for 

 ≥ 




 triggers action. A possible rationale for this —arbitrary— tie-
breaking rule is a little uncertainty about either going to the store or about future prices.
As a practical matter we can use median price as the threshold.
11The tie breaking rule requires a little more notation. Deﬁne  =m i n {argmin≤{pp−}}
and  =m a x {argmin≤{pp−}} These are the ﬁrst and last time 

 is charged in
the  −  to  period, respectively.



















+(·) is static demand deﬁned by (4). The indicator function takes care of two
requirements. First, we only want to purchase at time  for consumption in period  +  if
 = 

+, that is, if price  is as good as any other price between  +  −  and  + 
Second, the indicator takes care of breaking ties. Purchases take place at  only if  is the
ﬁrst event in which a price below the threshold is oﬀered, or the last, if the price is above
the threshold.
2.2.3 Predicted Behavior for T=1
We now spell out what equation (7) implies in the case of  =1 .F o c u s i n go n =1 , while
just a private case, serves two purposes. First, it will help clarify our estimating equations,
highlighting how the model is identiﬁed from the data. Second, it prepares the ground to
show how the model works under rational expectations.
Equation (7) dictates when consumers buy for future consumption, in this case for +1.
We will denote a period as either a non-sale period, ,o ras a l ep e r i o d ,.S a l ep e r i o d sa r e
periods in which the storing consumer buys for future consumption, that is for product 
period ,w h e n  +1. A non-sale period, ,i so n ew h i c h  +1.I f = +1
then the period is classiﬁed as a sale if   
 and non sale otherwise.
Consumers who store, purchase for storage at ,a n dn e v e rs t o r ea t When they store,
they do so for one period, and their purchases are dictated by (4). Thus, to predict consumer
behavior we only need to deﬁne 4 events (or types of periods): a sale preceded by a sale
(), a sale preceded by a non-sale (), a non-sale preceded by a sale (), and two
non-sale periods ().
Assume for a second that only product  can be stored. Given assumptions A1-A3 storers’
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() is the static demand of storers (deﬁned in (4)).
At high prices there are no incentives to store, in which case purchases equal either:
consumption, given by (), or zero, if there was a sale in the previous period (i.e., in 
consumption is out of storage). During sales preceded by a non-sale period purchases are
for current consumption as well as for inventory. During periods of sale preceded by a sale,
current consumption comes from stored units, so purchases are for future consumption only,
and the purchases equal 
+1( −+1) Notice the diﬀerence in the second argument of
the anticipated purchases relative to purchases for current consumption (e.g.,  vs )
Purchases for future consumption take into account the expected consumption of products
−
When all products are storable accounting for storability is immediate. The way to
incorporate the dynamics dictated by storage is to consider the eﬀective cost (or price) of
consumption, which does not necessarily coincide with current price. In other words, if −
is purchased on sale for future consumption, its eﬀective future price, 

−+1 is its current
(sale) price since the product will be stored today for consumption tomorrow. For example,
consider the event  (product  i sn o to ns a l ea t nor at −1) and assume that product




−) instead of 
( −). A similar adjustment is needed in every state, to
account for consumption out of storage.
There are two important implications of equation (8) for estimation. First, when we
estimate the model we will use the states to scale demand up or down, but as equation (8)
suggests we will use the actual prices for estimation. The deﬁnition of the  and  is used
to deﬁne the state not to modify prices: prices are not restricted to take on two values and
can take on any value
Second, we can see from equation (8) that contemporaneous prices of other products
are the wrong control in the estimation. Controlling for current price generates a bias in
the estimated cross price eﬀe c t . I na ni n v e n t o r ym o d e l ,t h ee ﬀective or shadow price is a
complicated creature that requires solving the value function. In our framework, for  =1 
eﬀective prices are just the minimum of current and previous prices.
Allowing for larger  in the estimation is immediate. Equation (8) requires adjustment
to reﬂect that consumers can anticipate for longer periods ahead, as reﬂected in (7), basi-
cally rescaling up in case of anticipated purchases, and rescaling demand down, in case of
consumption out of storage. Moreover, eﬀective prices are the minimum of the previous 
periods. Basically, period  consumption is the static demand based on pef
t  while purchases
take place at the time the eﬀective price is charged.
132.2.4 Rational Expectations
We now explore demand under A3’, of rational expectations, while continuing to assume A1
and A2. We will also focus on the  =1case. Under these assumptions equation (5) is still
valid in the single product case (i.e., if other products are either not present or are sold at
a constant price) but we need an appropriate classiﬁcation of  and  periods
N a t u r a l l y ,w ec a n n o td e ﬁne a sale based on  +1prices, which are not yet known (ab-
sent perfect foresight). Given the distribution of future prices, as shown in Hong et al.
(2002) and Perrone (2010), there is a threshold below which the good is purchased for future
consumption. We thus deﬁne sale and non-sale periods based on the price thresholds.
We will classify the periods of high prices as non-sale and low prices as sales. At high
prices buyers do not have an incentive to store, denote them as  periods. During a sale
period,  consumers have an incentive to store, even if some sales are deeper than others.
Thus, rational expectations and unrestricted price support work ﬁne in the single product
case.2
When more than one product is storable the analysis involves the following issue. At
t h et i m eo fp u r c h a s i n gp r o d u c t the (eﬀective) prices of other products may not be known.
They would be known, for example, if the other products are on sale, in which case the
eﬀective price is the current sale price. In general, when some other products are not on
sale, the consumer has to purchase product  under uncertain − prices. Thus in period 

















represents optimal − consumption in +1given price realizations and pre-stored quantities
Basically, at  the consumer chooses product  purchases knowing − consumption is con-
tingent on the eventual − price.
With a general price support the problem is solvable but it can be tedious since it requires
solving for q∗ for each point in the support of prices. The computation is much easier
(especially for a small number of products) if we assume a two price support: 
 and 
  For
example, suppose Coke is on sale and Pepsi is not, the consumer has to decide how much
Coke to purchase for +1knowing Pepsi’s price at +1may end up at one of two diﬀerent
levels. The demand for Coke involves the solution of three ﬁrst order conditions for: ,
2The only minor subtlety is whether consumers that stockpiled buy additional units should the realized
price be lower than the preceding price. It is possible that consumers purchase additional units given the
low price, or that they pay no attention to products in categories for which they already stored (they do not
even go through that aisle). Equation (5), as written, assumes the latter, but both options can be handled.
14Coke purchase at  for consumption at  +1  , Pepsi consumption at  +1if Pepsi ends
up being on sale, and  Pepsi consumption absent a sale.
While the two price support may come handy in the estimation of the rational expecta-
tions model, as we now explain, the model can still be estimated with an unrestricted price
distribution. Notice that only in some states predicted behavior requires knowledge of future
prices. For example, if both products are in  demand does not depend on future prices.
In those states where predicted demand does not depend on future prices the predicted
behavior as explained in the previous section is still valid, and can be used in the estimation
under rational expectations. It turns out that in the 2 goods case, 10 of the 16 states
(composed of the cross product of the 4 states of each good) predicted purchases of each
product are the same under both expectations assumptions. In total only 2 out of the 16
states involve behavior that diﬀers for both products. Thus, a way to estimate the model
under rational expectation, without incurring additional computation costs and without
the two price assumption, is to restrict the sample to periods where demand under both
expectations assumptions coincide. We elaborate on this below.
2.3 Seller Behavior
We start by considering a monopolist facing a population of non-storers and storers with
static demands given by () and (). We drop the time subscript, but it is immediate
to allow for changing demand. Marginal cost is .L e t ∗
 and ∗
 be the prices that
maximize —static— proﬁts from separately selling to the populations of storers and non-
storers, and ∗
 the monopoly price of a non-discriminating monopolist facing the whole
population, composed of non-storers and storers. ∗







We initially consider optimal prices in a two period set-up. Storability may enable price
discrimination if the seller would like to target storers with a lower price. Once storers
purchase for future consumption the seller can target non-storers with higher prices.
In some cases a constant price might be optimal. It is, for example, if ∗
 ≤ ∗
 On the
other hand, suppose the seller charges  in the ﬁrst period and ∗
 in the second period, for
some ∗
  ∗










15The ﬁrst term represents variable proﬁts during sales, targeting storers who purchase for two
periods, and non-storers for one period. The last term represents proﬁts from non-storers,






 then the pair { ∗
} does better than constant prices. Since the
best constant price is ∗
, the above inequality guarantees all other constant prices do worse
than the proposed price pair. It is an empirical matter whether constant or increasing prices
are proﬁtable. It depends on whether — using Robinson (1933)’s terminology — non-storers
are the strong market while storers the weak market.
We assume throughout the concavity of objective functions. Thus assuming condition (9)
holds then an increasing price sequence is optimal and the prices  and ∗
 are determined
by the solution to the following ﬁrst order conditions:

∗












In a longer horizon we need to show that the price sequence proposed in the previous section
is feasible, and that no other price sequence does better. Consider horizons of length 2.
It is immediate to see that for any  ≤  +1the analysis of the previous section is still valid,
with optimal prices being  for one period -to supply storers- followed by ∗
 afterwards.
As long as the horizon is no longer than the storing period the seller clears storers out of the
market and then targets non-storers.
In longer horizons, +1—if discrimination is proﬁtable- cyclical prices are optimal.
The simplest case to consider is  =1 ; the analysis is similar for larger .W es t i l la s s u m e
the monopolist can commit to future prices; we later argue that the same predictions arise
absent commitment, and under duopoly with commitment.






( −1 +1)( − )
where ( −1 +1) is given by 5. As before, we assume a ﬁnite horizon to avoid an
inﬁnite sum due to the lack of discounting. The maximization boils down to picking a
sequence of prices, such that if −1 ≤  storers stockpile for future use.
16Proposition 1 Under condition (9) optimal pricing involves cycles of  followed by  with
∗
   = ∗

Proof. First consider the last two periods in isolation. Under condition 9 optimal prices
are  followed by 
Now look at a 4-period problem. The proposed cycle is feasible and attains twice the
proﬁt so ft h et w op e r i o dp r o b l e m .T os e ei ti sf e a s i b l en o t i c et h a tt h ec a n d i d a t ep r i c e sd on o t
generate storage between periods 2 and 3. Absent a link between period 2 and 3, consumers
behave as prescribed in each independent cycle (the ﬁrst cycle is periods 1 and 2, the second
is periods 3 and 4).
It remains to be shown that no other price sequence is more proﬁtable. First notice that
for any price sequence with 2  3 to be optimal it has to be our candidate [,  , ].
Since 2  3 implies no storage in period 2, thus the two cycles are detached. The solution
to the detached problems involves  followed by  in each part.
It remains to rule out price sequences that involve storing in period 2, i.e., sequences
with 2 ≤ 3 If 2 ≤ 3 consumers store in period 2. Having purchased for period three
c o n s u m p t i o ni np e r i o dt w o ,i np e r i o dt h r e es t o r e r sw o u l do n l yp u r c h a s ef o rp e r i o df o u r
consumption, and they would do so only if 3 ≤ 4 Suppose that indeed storers purchase in
period three for period four consumption. Since storers are absent in period four, the optimal
4 is  while the best third period price is ∗
 In the alternative case, in which storers do
n o tp u r c h a s ei np e r i o dt h r e et h eo p t i m a lp r i c eo np e r i o dt h r e ei s followed by ∗
 in period
four, since in the last period all customers are present (and there are no further purchases
for storage). Lets go back to the ﬁrst two periods. There are two cases to consider, either
storers store in period one or they do not. If they store the only candidate for ﬁrst period
price is , moreover, in period two they store for period three, thus the optimal price is ∗
.
If they do not store in period one the optimal ﬁrst period price is ∗
 while the second
period optimal price is  Thus, the optimal prices in the ﬁrst two periods (given storage
between periods two and three) are: {∗
 } or { ∗
} followed by {∗
} or {∗
}
in periods three and four. Either way proﬁts amount to 2∗
+() which by condition
9i sl o w e rt h a n2(). Thus, the cycling prices do better than any other price sequence
in the four period problem.
It is interesting to notice that the cycle delivers discrimination twice, while the best
alternative pricing that links periods achieves once the discriminating proﬁt level and for
two periods the non-discriminating proﬁt level. Cycling prices maximize the times the seller
discriminates across buyers.
We can keep adding two-periods at a time and apply the same reasoning. The cycle is
feasible, and optimal assuming no storage between cycles. On the other hand, a sequence
that induces storage between cycles, as above, fails to exploit discrimination at least once.
17Finally, we need to consider odd . It is easy to see that as we go from two to three
periods the best the seller can get is ∗
 + () namely, one event of discrimination
plus a non-discriminating proﬁt ﬂow. The same is true for any -long horizon.
T h ep r o p o s e ds a l ec y c l el e a d st oaﬂow proﬁt (per two-period cycle) of () The
prediction is similar to Narasimhan and Jeuland (1985), which shows that cyclical pricing
(sales) help sellers intertemporally price discriminate when buyers with more intense needs
have more limited storage.
It is not diﬃcult to show that the non-commitment solution coincides with the commit-
ment solution. The proof is a little tedious as it involves many cases, but roughly consider
what the possible deviation are. Lowering prices on a non-sale period is of no beneﬁt, while
raising during a sale period does not help either (since it eliminates a discrimination event).
2.3.3 Duopoly
In the context of our application there is more than one manufacturer. We show that in the
commitment equilibrium both sellers charge cycling prices.
Consider ﬁrm  taking as given ﬁrm ’s cycling prices. Since storers always purchase
good  at the sale price, their demand is 
 (
) namely, it is the same in every period
regardless of the current price of product . In contrast, the non-storer’s demand 
 ( )
depends on the contemporaneous price of product 
Deﬁne non-discriminating proﬁts by ﬁrm  for each of the two prices charged by  as:
∗
(). We can now modify 9 for the duopoly case. The following is a suﬃcient condition


















Condition (11) says that in a two-period problem ﬁrm  taking as given ’s low-high
price sequence, gains from intertemporal price discrimination. Namely,  best responds
using cycling prices.
The same reasoning used to show that cycles are optimal for the monopolist in a longer
horizon, applies to the duopolist problem as well.3
3There is an additional issue, the timing of the sales. It is possible that non-coincidental cycles are more
proﬁtable than coincidental sales. The issue does not arise in a two-period set up since there is no point of
having a sale in the second period. We abstract for the moment from the timing issue, that could arise in a
longer horizon, a condition like 11 would determine optimal timing.
183 Data and Estimation
3.1 Data
The data set we use was collected by Nielsen and it includes store-level weekly observations
of prices and quantity sold at 729 stores that belong to 8 diﬀerent chains throughout the
Northeast US, for the 52 weeks of 2004. We focus on 2-liter bottles of Coke, Pepsi and store
brands, which have a combined market share of over 95 percent of the market.
There is substantial variation in prices over time and across chains. A full set of week
dummy variables explains approximately 20 percent of the variation in the price in either
Coke or Pepsi, while a full set of chain dummy variables explains less than 12 percent of
the variation.4 On the other hand, a set of chain-week dummy variables explains roughly 80
percent of the variation in price. Suggesting similarity in pricing across stores of the same
chain (in a given week), but prices across chains are diﬀerent. It seems that all chains charge
a single price each week. However, three of the chains appear to deﬁne the week diﬀerently
than Nielsen. This results in a change in price mid week, which implies that in many weeks
we do not observe the actual price charged just a quantity weighted average. In principle we
could try to impute the missing prices. Since this is orthogonal to our main point we drop
these chains.
Figure 2 displays the distribution of the price of Coke in the ﬁve chains we examine
below. For some of the results below we need to deﬁn eas a l ep r i c e—ap r i c ei nw h i c h
consumers stockpile. The distribution seems to have a break at a price of one dollar, so we
deﬁne any price below a dollar as a sale, namely, a price at which storers purchase for future
consumption. This is an arbitrary deﬁnition. A more ﬂexible deﬁnition may allow for chain
speciﬁc thresholds, or perhaps moving thresholds over time. For the moment we prefer to
err on the side of simplicity. Using this deﬁnition we ﬁnd that approximately 30 (36) percent
of the observations are deﬁned as a sale for Coke (Pepsi). Interestingly, sales are somewhat
asynchronized with only 7 percent of the observations exhibiting both Pepsi and Coke on
sale (compared to a 10.5 percent predicted if the sales were independent).
4These statistics are based on the whole sample, while the numbers in Table 2 below are based on only
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Figure 2: The Distribution of the Price of Coke
Note: The ﬁgure presents a histogram of the distribution of the price of Coke over 52 weeks in 729
stores in our data.
For the analysis below we use 24,674 observations from ﬁve chains. The descriptive
statistics for the key variables are presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
% of variance explained by:
Variable Mean Std chain week chain-week
 446.2 553.2 5.6 20.4 52.5
 446.0 597.8 2.8 24.4 46.7
 1.25 0.25 7.1 29.7 79.9
 1.19 0.23 7.5 30.7 79.8
Coke Sale 0.30 0.46 6.4 30.0 86.6
Pepsi Sale 0.36 0.48 9.3 29.2 89.0
Note: Based on 24,674 observations for ﬁve chains, as explianed in the text. As sale is deﬁned as
any price below one dollar.
3.2 Identiﬁcation and Estimation
We estimate the parameters of the model by matching observed purchases and those pre-
dicted by the model. The estimation follows standard methods where the exact form of
20demand varies by (observable) state. It simplest to see in the case of  =1 .A s w e c a n
see in equation (8) the predicted purchase at time  has three terms: the demand by non-
storers, demand by storers for  and demand by storers for  +1 . Each of these terms has
the functional form of the static demand function given in (4). Depending on the state one
or both of the demand terms for the storers might be zero. The same idea holds for higher
 (in general there are  +2terms). The prices that enter the demand terms are eﬀective
prices, deﬁned in equation (6), which impacts estimates of cross price eﬀects. Notice that
eﬀe c t i v ep r i c e sa r ef u n c t i o n so fa c t u a lp r i c e sa n dn o ta v e r a g e sw i t h i nas t a t e .
The parameters of the model are identiﬁed from market level data by conditioning on
past and future prices holding current prices constant. For example, under A3 and  =1 ,
periods when −1   and   +1 identify the preferences of non-storers, since storers do
not purchase in these periods. The preferences of storers are identiﬁed, for instance, from
periods when −1 ≥   +1 and periods when −1 ≤   +1 In both these periods
storers buy for a single period so after netting out the demand of non-storers from the total
amount purchased the demand of storers can be identiﬁed.
We present estimates under perfect foresight and rational expectations. In the rational
expectations model, with 2 products and  =1 , there are 16 states (4 for each product).
In 10 of these states the purchasing pattern predicted by the rational expectations model
equals the perfect foresight model, using the same deﬁnition of a sale, and therefore we can
recover preferences under rational expectations by restricting the sample to those states.
F o re x a m p l e ,s u p p o s et h eC o k es t a t ei s. If the Pepsi state is either  or  then
both models predict purchases for consumption today using the current price of Pepsi as the
relevant cross price. However, if the Pepsi state is either  or  then the models diﬀer
in their prediction. Under both models the consumer bought Pepsi at −1 for consumption
at ,b u tt h em o d e l sd i ﬀer in how much was bought and therefore how much Coke is bought
at 5








 +  =1 2  =3−  =   (12)
where  is a store speciﬁc intercept for each brand, and  is an i.i.d. shock. The parameters
 allow for diﬀerent intercepts for each consumer type. We scale these parameters to add
up to one and deﬁne  =  =1−, as the relative intercepts which is also the fraction
of non-storers when all prices are zero.
5In addition to the example in the text, the other 4 states where the models diﬀer in their prediction for
Coke purchases are when the Coke state is  and Pepsi state is either  or ,o rC o k es t a t ei s
and Pepsi state is either  or  Symmetric arguments hold for Pepsi.
21We also experimented with a linear demand speciﬁcation. In general, the demand results,
such as the diﬀerence between the static and dynamic model and the diﬀerences between
storers and non-storer, are similar. However, in the linear model predicted demand can be
negative (specially storers’ demand at a high price). The log-linear speciﬁcation avoids the
negativity problem by imposing an asymptote to zero consumption as price increases.
We estimate all the parameters by non-linear least squares. We minimize the sum of
squares of the diﬀerence between the observed purchases and purchases predicted by the
model. We present the exact estimating equations in the Appendix. We should stress that
in all cases we use actual prices: the deﬁnition of sales is used to deﬁne the states but in
no way do we modify or average prices within state. In principle, we could use instrumental
variables to allow for correlation between prices and the econometric error term. However,
we do not think correlation between prices and the error term is a major concern in the
example below. To obtain the exact estimating equations we combine equations (5) and
(12), and allow for store ﬁxed eﬀects. To account for the store level ﬁxed eﬀects we de-
mean the data, which makes all the parameters enter the equations non-linearily. Still the
estimation is quite straightforward. We show in the Appendix how to modify the estimating
equation to account for the ﬁxed eﬀects.
4R e s u l t s
4.1 Demand Estimates
The estimation results are presented in Tables 3 and 4. The diﬀerent columns present
estimates under alternative assumptions. In all cases the dependent variable is the (log of
the) number of 2-liter bottles of Coke or Pepsi sold in a week in a particular store. All
regressions include store ﬁxed eﬀects as well as the price of the store brand.
4.1.1 Main Results
The ﬁrst two columns in Table 3 display estimates from a static model. The rest of the
columns present estimates from the dynamic model under diﬀerent assumptions. In all cases
we assume  =1and allow for diﬀerent price sensitivity for storers and non-storers. We also
impose two restrictions. First, we impose the same  for Coke and Pepsi. We could allow
for two parameters, but consistent with the idea of a population of storers who decide what
product to purchase we impose the same parameter. Second, the cross price eﬀect between
Coke and Pepsi is imposed to be symmetric.
Columns 3 and 4 present estimates from the model with perfect foresight (assumption
A3) and deﬁning sales based on actual prices: consumers stockpile if prices at  are lower
22than  +1prices. The next set of columns continue to assume perfect foresight but uses a
diﬀerent deﬁnition of a sale. Now a sale is deﬁned as any price below 1 dollar: whenever a
buyer observes a price below a dollar they purchase for future consumption.6 In both cases,
the deﬁnition of a sale is just used to deﬁne the state. We do not average prices within a
state: actual prices are used.
The ﬁnal set of columns continue to deﬁne a sale as any price below 1 dollar but assume
rational expectations instead of perfect foresight. As we discussed in Section 2.2.4, the
rational expectations model requires us to solve a system of equations. Alternatively, we
can estimate the model by restricting the sample to periods in which predicted demand does
not depend on future prices. This is the approach we follow in the last columns. Hence the
perfect foresight and rational expectations models deliver the same predictions and therefore
the only diﬀerence with the estimation in columns 5 and 6 is in the periods used. Indeed,
because of the conditioning, to such states, the number of observations goes down from
45,434 to 30,725.7
Overall, the results from all three models are similar. For the purpose of computing
the beneﬁts from price discrimination the key is the heterogeneity in the price sensitivity.
The three models suggest almost identical numbers: non-storers are signiﬁcantly less price
sensitive than storers. This is consistent with price discrimination being a motivation for the
existence of sales. The main diﬀerence across the three sets of results is in the cross-price
elasticity of storers. The lower cross price eﬀects under perfect foresight perhaps suggests
A3 introduces measurement error. For of the calculations below the diﬀerence between the
models is not of great importance.
The parameter  measures the relative intercepts of the demand for the two consumer
types. This is not a measure of the relative importance of the two groups. Since storers are
more price sensitive they will be a smaller fraction of demand at actual prices. Indeed, as we
will see below for most observed prices demand from non-storers will constitute the majority
of quantity sold.
6Predictions diﬀer, for example, when  =0 99 and +1 =0 95 In the second model, at  consumers
purchase for future consumption while in the former they wait for the better price at  +1 .
7The main reason to present the model in columns 5 and 6 is to separately show the eﬀect of the change
in the deﬁnition of a sale from the eﬀect of the change in the sample.
23Table 3: Estimates of the Demand Function
Static Model Dynamic Models
PF PF-Alt Sale Def RE
Coke Pepsi Coke Pepsi Coke Pepsi Coke Pepsi
 non-storers -2.30 -2.91 -1.41 -2.11 -1.49 -2.12 -1.27 -1.98
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
 non-storers 0.49 0.72 0.61 0.71 0.63
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
 storers -4.37 -5.27 -4.38 -5.08 -5.57 -6.43
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12)
 storers 0.61 0.34 2.12
(0.04) (0.04) (0.09)
 — — 0.14 0.10 0.21
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
# of observations 45434 45434 30725
Note: All estimates are from least squares regressions. The dependent variable is the (log of)
quantity of Coke sold at a store in a week. All columns include store ﬁxed eﬀects. Columns labeled
PF use perfect foresight (Assumption A3), while columns labeled RE use rational expectations
(Assumption A3’). Columns 3 and 4 deﬁne the states using actual prices, while the last four
columns use the alternative deﬁnition of a sale as any price below 1 dollar. The RE model uses the
alternative deﬁnition of sale but restricts the sample. See the text for details. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses.
The own price elasticity implied by the dynamic results evaluated at the quantity weighted
price for Coke is 2.16 and for Pepsi 2.78, while the elasticities implied by the static estimates
are 2.46 and 2.94, respectively. As expected, neglecting dynamics in the estimation overstates
own price elasticities.
4.1.2 Sensitivity Analysis: Heterogeneous Storage
Until now we assumed  =1  We now examine the sensitivity of the results to the deﬁnition
of  The ﬁrst two sets of columns, in Table 4, present estimates of the same model as in
columns 3-4 of Table 3, but assuming  =2and  =3 , respectively. The results are very
similar to those in Table 3. The main change is that the estimates compensate somewhat for
the storers’ extra periods of storage by: slightly increasing the fraction of non-storers and
the price sensitivity of the storers.
Since the results are similar we want a way to select between the diﬀerent values of 
The last two sets of columns do this. We allow for 3 types: non storers, consumers who
24can store for  =1(denote their fraction =1) and consumers who can store longer, either
 =2or  =3 . We look at the fraction of each type of consumers.
In columns 5-6 the fraction of non-storers is 0.15. Essentially identical to the estimates in
Table 3. The fraction of consumers who can store for  =1periods is 0.84, suggesting that
roughly 1% of consumers store for  =2 .T h u s ,t h e =2type are non signiﬁcant relative
to the  =1type.8 The last pair of columns paint a similar picture. Here the fraction of
consumers who store for 3 periods is less than 5%. These results suggest that  =1is the
preferred option.
Table 4: Estimates of the Demand Function
PF-T=2 PF-T=3 PF-T=1,2 PF-T=1,3
Coke Pepsi Coke Pepsi Coke Pepsi Coke Pepsi
 non-storers -1.62 -2.37 -1.97 -2.42 -1.44 -2.09 -1.43 -2.10
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
 non-storers 0.67 0.69 0.64 0.64
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
 storers -4.25 -5.47 -5.31 -5.09 -4.34 -5.20 -4.31 -5.21
(0.07) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
 storers 0.81 0.78 0.65 0.79
0.04 (0.09) (0.04) (0.04)
 0.31 0.41 0.15 0.17
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.12)
=1 0.84 0.78
(0.02) (0.02)
Note: All estimates are from least squares regressions. The dependent variable is the (log of)
quantity of Coke sold at a store in a week. All columns include store ﬁxed eﬀects. In all columns
we estimate the model with perfect foresight, the diﬀerences are in the length of T and the number
of diﬀerent types of consumers. Standard errors are reported in pharenthesis.
4.2 Implications for Pricing and Welfare
We now examine the implications of the estimates. We focus on the role of sales as a
form of intertemporal price discrimination and its welfare implications. We consider two
benchmarks: (non-feasible) third degree discrimination, targeting storers and non-storers
with diﬀerent prices, and nondiscrimination, a single price for all consumers.
8Since the price sensitivity of all storers is the same the relative fraction of  =1consumers and  =2
consumers will stay the same at all prices.
25The analysis neglects the vertical relation between manufacturer and retailer, which could
generate double marginalization. The relation between retailers and manufacturers is quite
interesting and subtle, but beyond the scope of this paper. The ﬁrst order conditions in
equation (10) represent either a manufacturer selling to a competitive retailing industry or
integrated pricing with transfers (which avoids double marginalization).
4.2.1 Markups and Proﬁts
A standard exercise is to use demand estimates and a ﬁrst order condition from a static
proﬁt maximization to infer markups and marginal costs. Following this approach and using
the ﬁrst two columns of Table 3 we get an implied markup for Coke of 43 cents, and 34 cents
for Pepsi. Subtracted from a quantity weighted average transaction price of 1.07 and 1.01,
respectively, leads to marginal costs of 66 and 67 cents respectively.
Repeating this calculation using the dynamic demand estimates reported in Table 3, but
still relying on a static ﬁrst order condition, the implied margin for Coke is 50 cents and a
marginal costs of 57, while 37 and 64 cents for Pepsi. The lower dynamic elasticities translate
into higher implied mark-ups.
Naturally, demand dynamics render the static ﬁrst order conditions inadequate as a de-
scription of seller behavior. So we now turn to the dynamic pricing model. We compute
prices and proﬁts under non-discrimination, third degree discrimination and sales. We as-
s u m et h em a r g i n a lc o s td u r i n gs a l ea n dn o n - s a l ep e r i o d si st h es a m e .S i n c ee a c hﬁrst order
condition delivers a diﬀerent marginal cost, we use the average across the regimes to compute
prices and proﬁts.
Table 5 displays the optimal regular, non-sale, prices and sale prices for Coke and Pepsi
under the diﬀerent pricing assumptions. We also show proﬁts relative to discrimination. By
discrimination we mean the case where the ﬁrms can identify the storers and non-storers,
set diﬀerent prices for each group and prevent arbitrage. This is of course non-feasible but
serves as a benchmark to measure the maximum attainable gains from third degree price
discrimination.
By comparing the discriminatory and non-discriminatory prices we see the potential role
of sales in targeting price sensitive buyers with a lower price. The optimal non-discriminatory
price is 1.11 for Coke and 1.04 for Pepsi. These prices are in between the discriminatory
prices for both products: 1.31 and 0.83 for Coke and 1.14 and 0.86 for Pepsi. Non-storers,
being less price sensitive, are targeted with higher prices than storers. The discriminating
prices target non-storers with 58% higher Coke prices than storers’ prices. The gap is 33%
for Pepsi.
Rows labeled 3 and 4 present prices and proﬁts under two diﬀerent models of sales. The
numbers in row 3 use the demand estimates from columns 3-4 of Table 3 ( =1and perfect
26foresight) and in row 4 we present, for robustness, the results for the  =2model with
perfect foresight (columns 1-2 in Table 4). In all cases we assume the competitor charges the
non-discriminatory price. The exercise amounts to evaluating the impact of diﬀerent pricing
taking as given competitor’s behavior. In the next section we evaluate equilibrium regimes
where both players discriminate.
The optimal sale price is in between the non-discriminatory price and the storers’ dis-
criminating price. It diﬀers from the non-discriminatory price because it targets a population
with a higher proportion of storers, since they purchase for two periods. By placing more
weight on the price sensitive buyers, the sale price is lower than the non-discriminating one.
The estimates imply for Coke a sale price about 8% below the non-discriminatory price, and
5% lower for Pepsi.
The column labeled proﬁt, displays the fraction of the discriminating proﬁts (the highest
the seller can get) accrued without discrimination and through sales, respectively. For ex-
ample, for Coke the non-discriminatory seller gets 88% of the discriminating proﬁts, while
sales accrue between 91% of the discrimination benchmark.
Table 5: Gains from sales
Coke Pepsi
# Pricing Regular($) Sale($) Proﬁt(%) Regular($) Sale($) Proﬁt( % )
1 Non-discrimination 1.11 — 88 1.04 92




3 T=1 1.31 1.02 91 1.14 0.99 94
4 T=2 1.27 0.95 95 1.14 0.95 97
Note: Computed based on the estimates of columns 3-4 of Table 3, and columns 1-2 of Table 4
(for the T=2 case.) The columns labeled Regular and Sale present the regular and sale price,
respectively. The column labeled Proﬁt is the percent proﬁt in each regime relative to proﬁts
under discrimination. The marginal cost used in each case is computed using ﬁrst order conditions
averaged across diﬀerent states. The imputed mc are 0.6 for Coke and 0.67 for Pepsi.
In row 4 we examine the impact of a longer storage horizon,  =2 . In this model sales
are deeper, as they are aimed at demand that places more weight on storers who purchase
for current consumption and two periods ahead (and not just one period ahead as in the
 =1model). In turn, sales more eﬀectively capture additional gains from discrimination,
95% and 97% of the target for Coke and Pepsi respectively. Thus, capturing around 50% of
the gap in proﬁts between discrimination and non-discrimination.
274.2.2 Welfare
The welfare consequences of third degree price discrimination had been studied since Robin-
son (1933). The standard intuition is that in a monopoly situation price discrimination
will yield lower prices in the weak market, where the demand is more price sensitive, and
higher prices in the strong market, relative to the non-discriminatory price.9 So while sell-
ers are better oﬀ, some consumers are better oﬀ and others worse oﬀ.T h e o v e r a l l i m p a c t
of discrimination is an open question subsequently studied by Schmalensee (1981), Varian
(1984), Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010) among others. A necessary condition for welfare
to improve is that quantity sold increases. Since the allocation of goods across markets is
distorted, a constant —or lower— output would necessarily lead to lower total surplus (for a
formal proof see Schmalensee (1981)).
In the context of a duopoly the picture is slightly more complex, as it is not even clear
sellers are better oﬀ under discrimination. Few papers provide theoretical results. Boren-
stein (1985) and Holmes (1989) oﬀer conditions for output to increase under duopoly, and
simulations showing proﬁts may decline. Corts (1998) shows that even with well behaved
proﬁt functions all prices can decrease when the weak market of one ﬁrm is the strong market
of the other.
In this section we evaluate the impact of intertemporal discrimination on quantity and
welfare. We ﬁrst consider the implication of our estimates for a monopolist (i.e., a duopolist
that unilaterally best responds to given competitor behavior), and compare the ﬁndings to
the theoretical literature. We then consider the duopoly case where there is little theoretical
guidance.
Best Responses As a ﬁrst step we compute quantity changes holding ﬁxed the behavior
of competitors and assuming these competitors do not price discriminate. This allows us to
isolate the impact of diﬀerent pricing strategies. An additional advantage of this exercise is
that it is linked to the theoretical results in Schmalensee (1981) and Aguirre et. al. (2010),
since the seller is basically a monopolist.
It is worth mentioning that the third-degree discrimination theoretical results apply to
the intertemporal price discrimination as well. We just need to reinterpret demand during
sale periods, ()+2 (), as the weak demand, and demand during non-sale periods,
() as the strong demand.
Before looking at the numbers in Table 6 we turn to the theoretical literature for pre-
dictions and to make sure the functional forms we use are not responsible for our ﬁndings.
9The direction of price changes indeed follows this pattern if the monopolist’s proﬁt function is strictly
concave in price within each segment. When this is not the case the direction of price changes is ambiguous
(see Nahata, et al. (1990))
28Proposition 3 in Aguirre et al. (2010) encompasses our demand framework. They show that
welfare depends on the relative concavity of the demand functions in the two markets. Our
estimates deliver a more convex demand in the weak market, which is one of the conditions
singled out in Robinson (1933) for quantity to increase under discrimination. In addition,
what Aguirre et al. call the IRC condition10 holds for exponential demands, thus Proposition
3 therein applies. Proposition 3 is a comparative static with respect to the degree of price
discrimination.11 Proposition 3 shows that, for our estimated demand, welfare increases in
the extent of discrimination and then declines. A little discrimination is welfare improving,
full discrimination could deliver higher or lower welfare. In sum, even in the monopoly case
the impact on welfare is indeterminate. It is an empirical matter that we will evaluate with
the estimates.
Table 6 shows prices, quantities, and proﬁts under diﬀerent pricing regimes for the dif-
ferent segments of the market. Quantities and proﬁts are per week. Overall the table
paints a clear picture. Both quantities and proﬁts are higher under discrimination than
non-discrimination. Intertemporal discrimination is in between. While intertemporal dis-
crimination recovers about a quarter of the potential proﬁtd i ﬀerence between discrimination
and no discrimination, it delivers about half of the quantity increase.
It is interesting to see the breakdown by the consumer segments. It seems like sales are
af a i r l ye ﬃcient way of recovering the potential proﬁts from the consumers who store. Sales
seem to recover over 50% of the potential proﬁts from this group for Coke. The overall
gains in proﬁts is smaller because sales decrease proﬁts slightly from the non-storing group.
T h es a m ei st r u ef o rt h ei n c r e a s ei nq u a n t i t y :i tm o s t l yc o m e sf r o mt h es t o r e r s .T h en o n -
storers end up paying almost an identical, slightly higher, quantity weighted price relative
to non-discrimination.
10The condition requires the ratio of the derivative of welfare with respect to price to the second derivative
of proﬁts be monotonic in price, in each market.
11They follow the analysis in Schmalensee and Holmes whereby the implications of discrimination are
assessed by studying the behavior of a seller who is constrained to set prices in the weak and strong market
no more then  units apart. As  increases the optimum approaches full discrimination.
29Table 6: Quantity Eﬀects (no PD by competitors)
Coke Pepsi
Price Quantity ProﬁtP r i c e Q u a n t i t y P r o ﬁts
Non-Discrimination 318.00 161.86 425.27 157.45
non-storers 1.11 258.42 131.54 1.04 345.84 127.96
storers 1.11 59.58 30.32 1.04 79.43 29.39
3rd Degree Discrimination 397.44 184.58 482.79 170.60
non-storers 1.31 194.92 138.20 1.14 277.70 131.63
storers 0.83 202.52 46.38 0.86 205.09 38.97
Intertemporal Discrimination 353.12 167.78 446.06 160.44
non-storers-non-sale 1.31 194.92 138.20 1.14 277.70 131.63
non-storers-sale 0.99 307.36 118.64 0.98 394.18 121.41
storers - non-sale 1.31 0 0 1.14 0 0
storers - sale 0.99 101.98 39.36 0.98 110.12 33.92
Note: Computed based on the estimates of columns 3-4 of Table 3. Each entry shows the
price/quantity and proﬁts from each group under each regime.
Equilibrium We evaluate proﬁts and consumer surplus, when all competitors adhere to
each regime. In other words, instead of best responses, as we evaluated in the previous
section, we compare a regime that allows for discrimination to another regime where dis-
crimination is not allowed. The idea is to capture market performance under diﬀerent rules
(e.g., if discrimination was not allowed or feasible).
The ﬁrst step is to check quantity increases, absent them, welfare is bound to decline. As
Tables 7 and 8 show, for both products quantity increases under either form of discrimination,
third degree and intertemporal. Notice that relative to Table 6, that evaluated unilateral
discrimination —competitors pricing was taken as given— quantity changes are more modest.
All increases are lower, and the decline in the strong market is smaller as well. Quantity
eﬀects are attenuated by the prices of the competitor who also discriminates.
The impact on proﬁts is similar, aside from the strong market where interaction increases
proﬁts, overall proﬁt gains are attenuated by the competitor also discriminating.
As expected, buyers in the strong market are worse oﬀ, while those in the weak market
are better oﬀ. The column labeled ∆CS displays the change in consumer surplus, measured
by the equivalence variation12, relative to the non-discrimination case. In the case of third
12The equivalence variation (in this case identical to the compensating variation due to quasilinearity) of
a change in two prices is the sum of the area under each demand curve as the respective prices change. That
is, the area under the Coke demand curve ﬁxing the initial Pepsi price, plus the area under the Pepsi curve
ﬁxing the ﬁnal Coke price.
30degree discrimination non-stores are worse oﬀ but storers are better oﬀ because they are
oﬀered lower prices. In the case of intertemporal discrimination, non-storers can partly
beneﬁt from the sales but are charged higher prices during non-sale periods; overall they are
worse oﬀ. Storers are better oﬀ in both cases, but less so under intertemporal discrimination
because the prices they are charged are not as low as under third degree discrimination.
Total consumer welfare is down under third degree discrimination: the gains to the
storers are out weighed by the losses of the non-storers. In the case of sales the results
diﬀer between the products. For Coke consumer welfare slightly increases, while for Pepsi it
slightly decreases. In both cases the non-storers are worse oﬀ by roughly the same amount.
The diﬀerence is in the gains to storers: they are larger in the case of Coke because sales are
deeper relative to non-discrimination.
Total proﬁts increase under both forms of discrimination. Under third degree discrimina-
tion proﬁts from both segments increase, while under sales proﬁts from non-storers decrease.
Total surplus is higher under discrimination of either sort, than under a single price.
Looking at total surplus by segment, for both products it decreased in the non-storers seg-
ment.
Table 7: Equilibrium Welfare Eﬀects — Coke
Price Quantity Proﬁt ∆CS ∆Proﬁts ∆TS
Non-Discrimination 318.00 161.86
non-storers 1.11 258.42 131.54 — — —
storers 1.11 59.58 30.32 — — —
3rd Degree Discrimination 389.15 188.82 -12.33 26.96 14.62
non-storers 1.31 207.69 147.26 -45.04 15.72 -29.32
storers 0.83 181.46 41.56 32.71 11.24 43.95
Intertemporal Discrimination 350.02 168.65 4.54 6.78 11.33
non-storers - non-sale 1.31 207.69 147.26 -45.04 15.67 -29.32
non-storers - sale 0.99 295.96 114.24 34.71 -17.3 17.41
storers - non sale 1.31 0 0 — —
storers - sale 0.99 98.19 37.90 9.70 7.58 17.28
Note: Computed based on the estimates of column 3 in Table 3. Each entry shows the price/quantity
and proﬁts from each group under each regime. The last three columns present the change in con-
sumer surplus, proﬁts and total surplus relative to non-discrimination, respectively.
31Table 8: Equilibrium Welfare Eﬀects — Pepsi
Price Quantity Proﬁt ∆CS ∆Proﬁts ∆TS
Non-Discrimination 425.27 157.35
non-storers 1.04 345.84 127.96 — — —
storers 1.04 79.43 29.39 — — —
3rd Degree Discrimination 486.62 181.56 -16.38 24.21 7.83
non-storers 1.14 313.73 148.71 -36.49 20.75 -15.74
storers 0.86 172.89 32.85 20.10 3.46 23.56
Intertemporal Discrimination 441.87 162.14 -2.22 4.79 2.57
non-storers - non-sale 1.14 313.73 148.71 -36.49 20.75 -15.74
non-storers - sale 0.98 365.68 112.63 21.25 -15.33 5.92
storers - non sale 1.14 0 0 — — —
storers - sale 0.98 102.16 31.47 5.40 2.08 7.48
Note: Computed based on the estimates of column 4 in Table 3. Each entry shows the price/quantity
and proﬁts from each group under each regime. The last three columns present the change in con-
sumer surplus, proﬁts and total surplus relative to non-discrimination, respectively.
5 Concluding Comments
We study the impact of price discrimination when consumers can anticipate demand and
store for future consumption. To make the problem tractable we oﬀer a simple model to
account for demand dynamics due to consumer inventory behavior. We estimate the model
using store level scanner data and ﬁnd that consumers who store are more price sensitive.
This suggests that intertemporal price discrimination can potentially increase proﬁts, which
we then quantify. We ﬁnd that sales can recover 24-30% of the potential gains from (non-
feasible) third degree price discrimination. The estimates also suggest that total welfare
increases when sales are oﬀered.
A key to making our model tractable is the simplicity, some might say over-simplicity, of
the demand model. Its important to note that in order to take the general demand model in
Section 2.1 to the data one needs to also make some strong (mostly untestable) assumptions
regarding, for example, the functional form of inventory cost and consumer expectations
on how prices evolve (see, for example, Erdem, Imai and Keane, 2003, or Hendel and Nevo,
2006b). It depends on the application whether it is more reasonable to make the assumptions
of this paper or those of the previous literature. If one is willing to make the assumptions
herein the analysis is signiﬁcantly simpler and in many issues, like the supply side, becomes
tractable.
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347 Appendix: Estimating Equations
We choose the parameters to minimize the sum of squares of the diﬀerence between observed
purchases and those predicted by the model. Let  denote the purchases of product  in
store  at week . By equations (5) and (7), modifying for simplicity of presentation the
indicator functions in (7) to ignore ties in eﬀective prices , the purchases predicted by the

















I nt h ec a s eo f =1the predicted purchases consist of three components: the purchases by
non-storers and the purchases by storers for consumption at  and at  +1 . Depending on
the state, one or both of the components of demand by non-storers can be zero (see equation
8). We want to stress that in all cases we use the actual prices. The deﬁnition of sales is
only used to classify the states: prices are never changed.
The data consists of a panel of quantities and prices in diﬀerent stores. Diﬀerent stores
o p e r a t ea td i ﬀerent scales and therefore attract a diﬀerent number of customers and sell
diﬀerent average amounts. We account for this with a store ﬁxed eﬀect. Since purchases
are scaled diﬀerently in diﬀerent states in order to account for store ﬁxed eﬀects we need
to transform the predicted purchases as follows. Given the functional form in equation and












































































where log() denotes the average over weeks within a store and product. This transfor-












depends on the parameters of the model and cannot be done prior to estimation. In other
words we cannot transform the model prior to estimation rather the estimation routine needs
to compute the average for each value of the parameters.
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